Regulation and Public Law in Comparative Perspective by Rose-Ackerman, Susan
Susan Rose-Ackerman* REGULATION AND PUBLIC LAW IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Administrative law is a key determinant of legitimate executive-branch policy making.
Democracies cannot realistically limit policy making to the legislature. Delegation
under broad, framework statutes is essential for effective government, but it does
not eliminate the need for democratic responsiveness. Those interested in strengthening
democracy should not be content with the patterns of delegation, consultation, and
oversight that arise from the self-interested behaviour of politicians. This essay sum-
marizes a number of different models, but whatever route they choose, emerging democ-
racies need to assure rights to participate beyond a predetermined group of stakeholders
and to make these rights legally enforceable. Reformers in the emerging economies that
have been a focus of Michael Trebilcock’s work need to seek democratic legitimacy, not
just in electoral systems, but also in public administration.
Keywords: administrative law/accountability/regulation/public law/
comparative law/democracy
I Introduction
Michael Trebilcock is a pioneer in applying law and economics insights to
the study of developing and emerging economies. In a series of articles
and in a recent book with Ronald Daniels, he seeks to balance the
value of private enterprise in spurring development against the risks
that it will undermine the public interest if given too free a rein.
Unless controlled through contractual terms or regulatory and tax
policy, for-profit firms will not, on their own, consider distributive
justice, poverty alleviation, or ecology and public health.1 Furthermore,
Professor Trebilcock’s work balances the preservation of a society’s tra-
ditional ways of managing property and resolving disputes against the rec-
ognition that some traditions can be dysfunctional – promoting violence
and revenge and undermining entrepreneurial incentives. Trebilcock
acknowledges that existing practices, however culturally entrenched,
can be deeply dysfunctional, so that reformers need to find ways to over-
come these practices.2 Of course, reform will be easier if it can be tied to
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1 Ronald J. Daniels & Michael J. Trebilcock, ‘Private Provision of Public Infrastructure:
An Organizational Analysis of the Next Privatization Frontier’ (1996) 46 U.T.L.J. 375;
Michael J. Trebilcock & Ronald J. Daniels, Rule of Law Reform and Development:
Charting the Fragile Path of Progress (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2008).
2 Michael J. Trebilcock, ‘Communal Property Rights in Papua New Guinea’ (1984) 34
U.T.L.J. 387; Michael J. Trebilcock, ‘Comment’ in M. Bruno & B. Plescovic, eds.,
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existing behaviour and presented as an incremental change,3 but limiting
reform to such situations is likely to condemn some portions of the world
to perpetual poverty and violence.
Law and development specialists commonly urge emerging economies
to promote ‘the rule of law.’ In a recent paper Kevin Davis and Michael
Trebilcock sought to unpack this talismanic phrase and to show that it
stands for a wide range of not always consistent policies.4 To some, the
rule of law implies nothing more than clear and market-friendly rules.
To others, it means the protection of individual rights and legal account-
ability for past wrongs. I focus on yet a third aspect of the rule of law,
which is, I hope, compatible with Michael’s broad-gauged, interdisciplin-
ary approach. I concentrate on the way public institutions can help struc-
ture private-sector behaviour in the public interest, and I focus, in
particular, on the link between administrative law and public policy
making.5 I hope to contribute to the ongoing debate in comparative
law on convergence versus divergence in public law and to reflect on
the implications of that debate for administrative law reform in emerging
democracies, especially in Latin America and Eastern Europe.6 If all
advanced public law systems are converging to a similar set of legal prin-
ciples and practices, there may be few options for the rest of the world;
Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics – 1996 (Washington, DC: World
Bank, 1997) 229; Michael J. Trebilcock & Paul-Erik Veel, ‘Property Rights and
Development: The Contingent Case for Formalization’ (2008) 30 U.Pa.J.Int’l L. 397.
3 Robert Cooter, ‘The Rule of State Law and the Rule-of-Law State: Economic Analysis
of the Legal Foundations of Development’ in M. Bruno & B. Pleskovic, eds., Annual
World Bank Conference on Development Economics – 1996 (Washington, DC: World Bank,
1997) 191.
4 Kevin Davis & Michael Trebilcock, ‘The Relationship between Law and Development:
Optimists versus Skeptics’ (2008) 56 Am.J.Comp.L. 895.
5 Both Trebilcock’s work and my own are in a political economic tradition that stresses
the importance of institutions, including legal institutions, in influencing the
behaviour of politicians, bureaucrats, businesses, and citizens. It also examines the
way that political actors work to create institutions that will further their own
interests. For a collection of political economic readings in administrative law see
Susan Rose-Ackerman, ed., Economics of Administrative Law (Cheltenham, UK: Edward
Elgar, 2007). For a constitutional law and economics approach see Robert C. Cooter,
The Strategic Constitution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
My research in this area compares the public law system in Germany and those in
Hungary and Poland with that in the United States. See Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Controlling Environmental Policy: The Limits of Public Law in Germany and the United
States (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995) [Rose-Ackerman, Controlling
Environmental Policy]; Susan Rose-Ackerman, From Elections to Democracy: Building
Accountable Government in Hungary and Poland (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2005) [Rose-Ackerman, From Elections to Democracy].
6 See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, & Richard Stewart, ‘The Emergence of
Global Administrative Law’ (2005) 68 Law & Contemp.Probs. 15.
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emerging democracies must accept the growing consensus, modified only
by their own lack of financial and human resources. In contrast, if alterna-
tive models exist, nation-states can pick and choose. Colonial heritage
need not determine present-day reform, and the diversity of options
will give locally based reformers a way to resist overly doctrinaire propo-
sals both from insiders with a vested interest and from outsiders in the
aid and lending community.
My approach differs from two excessively deterministic strands in com-
parative law and in law and development. The first sees a dynamic conver-
gence of legal forms propelled by powerful global trends. The latter, in
contrast, stresses the dead hand of the past, especially colonialism, and
the unchangeable impact of geography and demography. Although
each explains some aspects of the real world, each is incomplete.
Instead, human agency interacts with history and circumstance to
produce diverse legal patterns that do not seem to be converging.
Countries are not inevitably caught in deterministic forces outside their
control. There is room for normative analysis and prescription if legal
reformers avoid simplistic cookie-cutter legal borrowing.
Law and development scholars debate the impact of colonial history
and past legal borrowing on present-day development experience.
Some claim that deep historical factors are the fundamental determi-
nants of economic growth and other variables. If this is true, then one
might conclude that countries cannot escape their history – some
countries’ pasts inexorably generate poor results. Some statistical work
uses historical factors for identifying purposes because they are clearly
independent of present-day institutions and thus solve the problem of
simultaneous causation. Statistical work variously finds that settler mor-
tality, colonial heritage, religion, and distance from the equator are
good proxies for today’s institutional structures.7
One difficulty with the convergence/difference debate is that the
cross-country empirical work characterizes a country’s legal system
using a single measure of legal tradition. It does not attempt to dis-
tinguish between public and private law or between constitutional law,
regulatory statutes, and private commercial law. To the extent that the
content of law enters the analysis, the literature highlights commercial
7 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, & Andrei Shleifer, ‘The Economic
Consequences of Legal Origins’ (2008) 46 J.Econ.Lit. 285. Critiques or modifications
of the legal origins literature are D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson, & J.A. Robinson, ‘The
Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation’ (2001)
91 Am.Econ.Rev. 1369; Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor, & Jean-Franc¸ois Richard,
‘Economic Development, Legality and the Transplant Effect’ (2003) 47
Eur.Econ.Rev. 165; Mark Roe, ‘Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets’
(2006) 120 Harv.L.Rev. 460.
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law and private economic law. There do, indeed, seem to be differences
in the way countries’ legal systems interact with private businesses, but the
oversimplified civil law/common law distinction suppresses the wide
range of actual experience.8
Neither the convergence hypothesis nor a model based on historical
or geographical determinism provides a persuasive unitary theory of
law’s impact. History, location, and legal origin are important, but many
emerging democracies have experienced huge changes that cannot easily
be tied to fixed country characteristics. Conversely, evidence for systemic
convergence is weak. Some observers too glibly assume overall conver-
gence from examples of mimicry along specific dimensions. Analysts
pose the empirical question of whether legal systems are converging and
the normative question of whether they ought to converge at too high a
level of generality. To make progress, one needs to unpack ‘the law’ and
distinguish between different substantive and procedural aspects.
Furthermore, the massive transformations that have occurred in
Central Europe, the former Soviet Union, China, and Vietnam demon-
strate that change is possible and can occur quite rapidly. The transitions
to democracy in Latin America and Asia, however unfinished and rough-
edged, demonstrate the same point. There is a tension in the literature
on law and development between using transplanted legal systems as
independent variables in statistical analysis and seeking to advise emer-
ging democracies on law reform. If legal reform is able to overcome
the legacy of history, then my less deterministic approach, which is com-
patible with Trebilcock’s work, can provide a more nuanced approach. It
aims to understand how government and private-sector institutions affect
economic outcomes and state legitimacy, and it considers how changes in
those institutions can further or retard democratic reform. It does not,
however, assume that convergence to a single model is the inevitable
result of a globalized world.
In what follows I concentrate on public accountability and administra-
tive law in states with democratic constitutional structures, elections, and
a representative legislature. Democracies cannot realistically limit policy
making to the legislature; delegation under broad, framework statutes
is essential for effective government, but it does not eliminate the need
for democratic responsiveness. Given that conclusion, democracies, new
and old, need to work toward public accountability – not just in the leg-
islature but in other institutions as well.
8 For an overview of the range of experience consult World Bank, Doing Business in 2010:
Reforming through Difficult Times (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009), online: Doing
Business – The World Bank Group ,http://www.doingbusiness.org..
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II Three types of public accountability
Government accountability is an important aspect of popular sovereignty.
It is a source of political legitimacy in three distinct senses. Call these
performance accountability, rights-based accountability, and policy-making
accountability.9
The first sense requires the state to carry out public programs compe-
tently, using expert professionals as needed and assuring a high level of
efficiency and integrity in the public service. Under this conception, pol-
itical actors set the goals, and bureaucrats ought to carry them out in a
cost-effective way – using whatever specialized knowledge is needed.
The key word is ‘competence,’ which implies both the use of experts
and the existence of hard-working, well-trained civil servants who do not
take bribes, embezzle funds, or create conflicts of interest. Call this per-
formance accountability. It requires both transparency – so that outsiders
can see what public officials and their agents are doing – and a means
of holding officials to account if they perform poorly or operate
outside the law.
Second, rights-based accountability implies legal constraints that protect
individuals against abuses of arbitrary power. It is not conditional on
popular sovereignty; even a limited autocracy may protect the individual
9 Rose-Ackerman, From Elections to Democracy, supra note 5 at 5–6, distinguishes between
performance accountability and policy-making accountability. Here I add a third sense
of the term. See also Jerry Mashaw, ‘Accountability and Institutional Design; Some
Thoughts on the Grammar of Governance’ in M.W. Dowdle, ed., Public Accountability:
Designs, Dilemmas and Experiences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 115.
Mashaw’s political and my policy-making accountability are closely related, as are his
managerial and my performance categories. See also Mark Bovens, ‘Public
Accountability’ in E. Ferlie, Laurence Lynn, & C. Pollitt, eds., Oxford Handbook of
Public Management (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 182.
The term ‘accountability’ is used in other senses as well and is often difficult to
translate appropriately. A general discussion of the concept is Carol Harlow,
Accountability in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 6–24.
Harlow points out that some use the term only in the retrospective or fiscal
accounting sense. She, however, uses a broader meaning that is consistent with my
approach. To her, ‘standard-setting is a vital element in the process of securing
accountability,’ and she gives ‘accountability a prospective dimension.’ Jacques Ziller,
‘Political Accountability in France’ in H. Broekstee, L. Verhey, & I. Van den
Driessche, eds., Political Accountability in Europe: Which Way Forward? (Groningen:
Europa Law, 2008) 83 at 84–5, points out that accountability is often translated into
French as responsabilite´ but that this term includes three concepts: political
accountability (responsabilite´ politique), criminal liability (responsabilite´ pe´nale), and civil
liability (responsabilite´ civile). To capture the broader implications of the English term,
however, French sometimes uses the plural, responsabilite´s, or reddition de comptes, the
official equivalent. Spanish uses an equivalent phrase, rendicio´n de cuantas.
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to some extent. These rights may be enforced through a written, consti-
tutional list of rights or by applying judicial concepts of ‘natural justice’ or
principes ge´ne´raux du droit. In the United States, the Bill of Rights plays this
role, as does the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in Canada. In Europe,
over and above national constitutions, the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) is beginning to have real bite, especially in the
United Kingdom, which lacks a written constitution. If one accepts the
value of a particular set of rights, a government is legitimate only if citi-
zens can monitor the enforcement of such rights and hold government
officials to account if they violate rights or fail to enforce principles of
natural justice.
Third, the policy-making process itself should be responsive to demo-
cratic values. There are two ways to achieve such accountability. One route
is through laws passed by representative assemblies and through refer-
enda. Here elections provide the link to public opinion. However, if
the legislature passes laws without direct public input, elections may be
an insufficient check.
My primary interest is in policy that is made outside the legislature. It
occurs inside the government/executive or in independent agencies and
private entities. Delegation of policy making is pervasive in modern
democracies, and it needs to be exercised in a manner consistent with
democratic values. I call this policy-making accountability, and my aim is
to analyse it and argue for its central importance.
Performance and rights-based accountability are background con-
straints. If a state cannot effectively deliver services, policy-making
accountability hardly matters. The same is true if a state routinely violates
rights. Taking these conditions as given, policy-making accountability
goes beyond issues of competence, honesty, and the protection of
rights. Statutes are frequently vague, unclear, and inconsistent, and
they often leave difficult policy issues to the implementation stage.
Delegation frequently requires the exercise of substantive policy discre-
tion by cabinet ministers, experts, and bureaucrats. Sometimes the execu-
tive makes policy on its own, without any statutory framework. In all cases,
however, officials must use their power in a manner consistent with demo-
cratic values. Electoral accountability is not sufficient, even for political
officials; it is too infrequent and too rough-grained.
Whatever the risks and the countervailing political pressures, legisla-
tures worldwide believe that the benefits of delegation outweigh the
costs, and some constitutions require a degree of devolution and del-
egation through federalism and through constitutionally mandated insti-
tutions, such as central banks and broadcasting commissions. Given the
ubiquity of delegation, I ask whether administrative law can help assure
the democratic character of policy making.
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III Policy-making accountability in administrative law
Administrative law can provide a framework for the achievement of
policy-making accountability. Although it is unlikely to be the first
order of business in emerging democracies, administrative law reform
must eventually be part of the process of democratic consolidation.10
Administrative law must move beyond review of the formal legality of
state actions toward the study of rules and principles that can enhance
political accountability and competent policy making. Protecting the
rights of individuals and businesses against an overarching state is not
enough; public law should also help to contain excess assertions of execu-
tive power and to monitor private or quasi-public entities that carry out
public functions.11 These constraints are likely to be especially important
in countries emerging from a period of authoritarian rule during which
executive power was unchecked.
The basic building blocks of my argument for a broad conception
of administrative law are the inevitability of policy-making delegation
in democracies; the need for delegated power to be politically accounta-
ble; a conception of accountability that requires openness to outside
opinions and expertise; and the claim that courts, as well as other inde-
pendent bodies, can play a constructive oversight role in assuring
accountability.
First, delegation of policy making outside the legislature is inevitable.
Generalist legislators have limited time, expertise, and staff resources.
They cannot respond to the complexity and fluidity of the policy environ-
ment with statutes that cover all eventualities in detail. Rather, they set the
policy framework that must be filled in by regulations, legal guidelines,
and/or the accumulation of individual case law. Experts need to help
make policy that involves scientific, engineering, and social scientific
material. Regulatory issues that arise on an ongoing basis need a perma-
nent body to resolve disputes and apply the law.
In addition to this practical necessity, legislators will often find it pol-
itically expedient to delegate policy-making authority. Even if a consti-
tutional non-delegation doctrine exists, a strict application of this
doctrine is not feasible, given the factors outlined above. Political expe-
diency combines with the logic of policy making to produce delegation
of authority. We come, then, to my first building block: most legislation
10 Rose-Ackerman, From Elections to Democracy, supra note 5.
11 Justice Stephen Breyer, quoting Benjamin Constant, refers to this as ‘active liberty’ or
the people’s right to ‘an active and constant participation in collective power.’ Stephen
Breyer, Active Liberty (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006) at 10.
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will not resolve all key policy issues. Instead, the law will assign policy-
making power to ministries, agencies, or other institutions.12
Second, as a result of such delegation, implementation is not merely a
technical exercise in legal gap filling. As a consequence, democratic legiti-
macy requires accountability from those with delegated policy-making
power. Of course, the legislature does provide oversight through its
power to determine budgets, review spending, hold hearings, set up com-
missions of inquiry, and so on. Members of opposition parties can play an
important role. But just as the legislature does not have the time, exper-
tise, or foresight to write detailed statutes ex ante, so, too, it lacks the
ability to provide comprehensive oversight ex post. Current political
imperatives determine legislative oversight priorities. As a consequence,
the legislature is likely to overlook a wide range of government activities.
Administrative law should aim to establish policy-making accountability
that does not depend on the shifting attentions of the legislature.
Third, policy-making accountability should aim to further the goals of
transparency, competence, and accountability.13 The process should
inform citizens and interest groups that a policy choice is imminent and
should give them an opportunity to express their opinions. At the same
time, expertise needs to be brought to bear, and policy makers need to
mediate conflicts between experts in a transparent way. The views of the
publicandtheexpertsmaydiverge, and theregulatoryauthority shouldcon-
sider the evidence and the strength and nature of public concerns before
promulgating a rule. The authority should publish the final rule along
with a justification that acknowledges the disputed nature of the choice.
Public law can help organize and manage consultation in a manner
consistent with the competent provision of services and the effective
regulation of the economy. Across nation-states, consultation and parti-
cipation in rule making vary in their legal status and in the nature of
public input. At one extreme, the law mandates such processes.14 At
the other, public hearings represent an illegitimate effort to override
the political will of the legislature.15 An intermediate case is one
12 On the reasons for delegation of policy-making authority from legislatures to the
executive see, e.g., James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation (New York: Basic Books,
1980); David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Delegating Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999); Susan Rose-Ackerman, ‘Introduction’ in Susan Rose-
Ackerman, ed., Economics of Administrative Law (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar,
2007) xiii at xv–vxii (reviewing the broader literature).
13 For a fuller discussion of the issues raised here see Rose-Ackerman, From Elections to
Democracy, supra note 5 at 216–39.
14 Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 [USAPA].
15 See, e.g., the classical German view of the Rechtstaat under which the administration is
subordinate to the law and the route for public involvement is through legislative
elections based on party competition. Nevil Johnson, State and Government in the
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where hearings are permitted but there is no legal recourse if they do not
occur.16
The process of involving the public can range from notice and infor-
mation requirements that cast outsiders in a watchdog role, through
acceptance of public comments as part of the rule-making process, to
negotiated consensual rules.17 The law may require government bodies
not only to consult but also to explain the reasons for their choices.18
Consultation may be open-ended or with a closed list of stakeholders. If
the law specifies the represented groups, the government may choose the
individual participants, or the groups themselves may select them.19 The
state may finance all participation or only subsidize the participation of
less wealthy and well-organized groups. Conversely, it can simply make
the process available to interested people or groups. These processes
may be purely advisory or legally required and enforceable in the courts.
The strongest form of public participation is one in which a consensus of
the stakeholders makes the policy choice. Only in a very narrow range of cir-
cumstances, however, will consensual processes be consistent with majoritar-
ian democracy.20 Furthermore, even in those cases, regulatory negotiation
requires a prior technocratic exercise that frames the issue. Stakeholders
should not negotiate about the facts. In the common case where consensus
is not feasible, a public hearing is an alternative route that pushes govern-
ment policy makers to take account of options that have strong public
support and to explain their reasons for accepting or rejecting them.
Hearings, however, may expose conflicts between government policy prefer-
ences and the wishes of outside interest groups and concerned citizens.
Federal Republic of Germany (Oxford: Pergamon, 1983). For a recent expression of this
view see Thomas Henne, Book Review of Environmental Policy in Germany and the
United States: Controlling Environmental Policy by Susan Rose-Ackerman, (2003) 51
Am.J.Comp.L. 207.
16 This is generally the case, for example, in Argentina, where a 2003 executive decree
(Decree 1172/2003, 3 December 2003, A.D.L.A. 2004-A, 174) established a
discretionary participatory process for administrative rule making.
17 Compare Francesca Bignami, ‘Three Generations of Participation Rights Before the
European Commission’ (2001) 68 Law & Contemp.Probs. 64 (outlining the
development of participation rights in the European Union from a focus on
enforcement procedures against individuals or firms to the beginnings of
participatory processes in the promulgation of general rules).
18 E.g., USAPA, supra note 14 at § 553(c). See Jerry Mashaw, ‘Reasoned Administration:
The European Union, the United States, and the Project of Democratic
Governance’ (2007) 76 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 99.
19 The use of stakeholder advisory committees is common in Europe. See, e.g., the cases
of Germany, Hungary, and Poland discussed in Rose-Ackerman, Controlling
Environmental Policy, supra note 5 at 63–6; Rose-Ackerman, From Elections to Democracy,
supra note 5 at 131–7.
20 Susan Rose-Ackerman, ‘Consensus versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at Regulatory
Negotiation’ (1994) 43 Duke L.J. 1206.
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Consultation with stakeholders is not sufficient. Agencies must also
consult those with expertise in the specialized areas subject to regulation,
but problems of public accountability can arise from the overuse of tech-
nocratic methods. Experts may conflict and may question not only others’
results but also their status as experts. A sceptical public may be difficult
to convince if complex policies depend on esoteric science and social
science.
However, the difficulty goes deeper. Even if no one had any problem
understanding the details of a cost–benefit analysis or risk assessment, it
does not follow that all would agree with its policy implications. Some will
bear the costs; others may want a distribution of benefits skewed toward
the poor; still others may weigh aesthetic or cultural values more highly
than the analyst. The mere use of analytic methods will seldom resolve
controversial issues. Analysis, however competent, cannot eliminate
deep disagreements over values.21 Expertise and public input may be in
tension over desirable policy. Striking a balance must be a central
concern for emerging democracies that wish to create accountable and
competent governments.
Delegated policy-making procedures should not be identical to legisla-
tive processes. In my normative framework, administrative law furthers
competent, accountable policy choices by requiring public authorities,
which might otherwise act in an insular way, to consult and to justify
their actions. Most legislatures face no such requirements. Laws are
seldom struck down by courts because hearings were not held or justifica-
tions were inadequate.22 Only violations of the most basic formal require-
ments or inconsistency with constitutional rights can normally void a
legislative action.23
The fourth and final step in the process is independent review that
checks the policy decision for conformity with the underlying substantive
21 See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, New Foundations of Cost–Benefit Analysis
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006) for a recent attempt to modify
CBA to take account of some its purported difficulties. For a critique of that effort
see Amy Sinden, Douglas A. Kysar, & David M. Driesen, ‘Cost-Benefit Analysis: New
Foundations on Shifting Sand’ (2009) 3 Regulation & Governance 27. See also
Jennifer Nou, ‘Regulating the Rulemakers: A Proposal for Deliberative Cost–Benefit
Analysis’ (2008) 26 Yale L.& Pol’y Rev. 601.
22 For an exception see Doctors for Life Int’l v. Speaker of the National Assembly, [2006] 12
B. Const. L.R. 1399 (S. Afr. Const. Ct.) (upholding participation rights for
legislation). The case is discussed in Karen Syma Czapanskiy & Rashida Manjoo,
‘The Right of Public Participation in the Law-Making Process and the Role of [the]
Legislature in the Promotion of This Right’ (2008) 19 Duke J.Comp.& Int’l L. 1.
23 For example, the legislative veto provision of a US statute was found to be
unconstitutional because the Supreme Court viewed it as law-making that did not
satisfy the Constitution’s bicameralism and presentment clauses: Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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statute and with the procedural constraints designed to ensure policy-
making accountability. The policy-making agency makes the ultimate
policy decision, but it must consult ex ante and justify its actions ex post,
subject to limited external review. The review process will check to see
that the policy maker has taken public input into account and made a
well-reasoned, publicly justified decision.24
This basic framework is normatively relevant for all kinds of consti-
tutional structures – from those with strong directly elected presidents
to pure Westminster parliamentary systems. The ability of representative
political institutions to override exercises of delegated authority differs
across systems; it is higher in parliamentary systems than in presidential
ones. However, policy making outside the legislature is pervasive in all
systems and cannot be sufficiently controlled by legislative oversight
alone. In presidential systems, the chief executive may make policy that
deviates from the aims of the original drafters of the statute or from
the current policy coalition in the legislature. To prevent the former,
the legislature can write detailed statutes; however, this practice will
exacerbate the latter problem and will also limit the executive’s ability
to respond to changes in external conditions or in scientific understand-
ings. In a parliamentary system, the same party coalition controls both the
executive and the dominant house of the legislature. This means that
the ‘government’ can readily amend statutes to conform to the aims of
the current political coalition.25 However, the professional civil service
often has a central policy-making role in parliamentary systems, especially
if the governing coalition changes frequently. Hence, procedural checks
on its authority can further public accountability much as they do in a
presidential system.26
IV Contrasting routes to policy-making accountability
Given this basic framework, policy-making accountability can take many
forms, which differ in their organizational structures, appointment pro-
cesses, and decision-making procedures. Matching the options to the sub-
stantive problems is a key aspect of good institutional design. If emerging
democracies look to the experience of more established polities, they will
24 See USAPA, supra note 14 at §§ 701–6 (setting out similar conditions for judicial review
of administrative action, including rule making).
25 George Tsebelis, ‘Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism,
Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism’ (1995) 25 Brit.J.Pol.Sci. 289.
26 However, the unitary government characteristic of a parliamentary system will have
little incentive to enact procedural constraints. See Terry M. Moe & Michael
Caldwell, ‘The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison
of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems’ (1994) 150 J.Inst.& Theor.Econ. 171;
Rose-Ackerman, Controlling Environmental Policy, supra note 5 at 7–17.
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find that states follow very different strategies as they balance public par-
ticipation, expertise, politics, professional norms, and the rule of law. Out
of this experience, I distil four stylized models to encapsulate the range of
choice. Call them the political model, the expertise model, the partisan-
balance model, and the privatized model. The political model builds in
accountability by entrusting the ultimate decision to those with political
affiliations. The expertise model delegates authority to neutral or expert
decision makers. Under the partisan-balance model, a politically accounta-
ble appointment process leads, in the ideal, to neutral, impartial
choices. The privatization model delegates policy making to a quasi-
private body that is largely independent of the government.
A POLITICAL DECISION MAKERS
In the political model, the legislature – a political body – delegates
policy-making authority to another politically responsible actor – be it
the president, the prime minister, or an individual cabinet member. The
civil service may help to frame issues, and legislation may require consul-
tation with experts or the public, but decisions are in the hands of political
actors. The route for redress is the ballot box or a lobbying campaign to
amend the statute or replace the politically responsible officials. Judicial
review is concerned only with whether the government has exceeded the
power granted to it by statute – often called ultra vires review.
An extreme form of political delegation is the power of presidents or
prime ministers to issue decrees with the force of law in the absence of
explicit delegation by statute. These decrees have external effect on
society; they are not just internal orders to the bureaucracy. The most
salient present-day examples are the decree powers of some Latin
American presidents and of the Russian president. In most cases, these
powers are time limited and must eventually be submitted to the legisla-
ture. Even these more limited cases, however, give the executive a first-
mover advantage.27
B EXPERT DECISION MAKERS
Some issues are not politically contentious. The legislature may safely del-
egate them to experts inside a government department or in an indepen-
dent body. For example, a statute might appropriate funds for basic
scientific research and leave it to an expert agency to apportion the
funds. In such cases, generalist courts have little role in reviewing
decisions, although specialized, similarly expert tribunals might provide
oversight.
27 John M. Carey & Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds., Executive Decree Authority (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998).
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But many policies, although highly dependent on expertise, generate
wide-ranging controversy. In these cases, even if experts have the auth-
ority to make the final decision, they often must engage in formal consul-
tation. A common response is to set up a broad-based advisory body that
government officials must consult but which has no legal right to decide.
The ultimate choice is left to technical experts.
This model, of course, makes sense only when politicians and their
constituents believe that they can identify experts who both have the rel-
evant information and are motivated to act in the public interest as seen
by the legislature. It assumes that there is no political debate over which
experts to consult; the science may be difficult to understand, but all
agree on the individuals who have the proper expertise. The problem
is simply that the overall issue cannot be resolved by expertise alone,
however technically competent.
To bring expertise in line with political interests, the implementing
statute might specify the framework for expert choice. For example, a
statutemight require the use of cost–benefit analysis (CBA) to set priorities28
and also mandate broad consultation. Experts in CBA would promulgate
the final rule, but consultation would help them to obtain information
on costs and benefits unavailable from published sources. They could
also gather opinions, both expert and lay, on contested issues with no
‘right’ answers.
The pathological version of the expert-led model is regulatory capture.
Experts might tilt their choices in favour of the regulated industry in the
hope of subsequent employment or, in the extreme, as a response to out-
right bribes.29 More subtle problems arise when the expert’s own knowl-
edge is not sufficient to make an informed choice. In such a case,
biased consultation, dominated by the regulated industry, could affect
the good-faith decisions of experts. Experts obfuscate their reasoning
and hide the uncertainties of science to avoid a straightforward recog-
nition of their own knowledge.
C PARTISAN BALANCE
The partisan-balance model explicitly acknowledges the tension at the
heart of modern regulatory policy – the conflict between political
accountability and expertise. I consider three variants. Call them the
institutional-constraints model, the partisan-balancing model, and the
28 Kenneth J. Arrow et al., ‘Is There a Role for Benefit–Cost Analysis in Environmental
Health and Safety Regulation?’ (1996) 272 Science 221.
29 George Stigler, ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’ (1971) 2 Bell J.Econ.&
Management Sci. 3.
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impartial-generalist model. The first two are common in the United States;
the third is familiar in the United Kingdom.
In the institutional-constraints model, one or more political bodies –
the legislature, the president, the senate, the political parties – appoint
the decision makers. Sometimes, as for US federal judges, the process
requires the consent of two or more partisan bodies. In other cases,
appointments require a supermajority, a method that incorporates min-
ority party preferences.30 Although political factors may dominate at the
appointment stage, institutional constraints limit the political pressures
on sitting officials, once appointed, and prevent narrow self-seeking for
personal gain. These institutional factors may include long or life
terms, fixed minimum salaries, earmarked sources of budgetary funds,
overlapping terms for multi-member bodies, removal only ‘for cause,’
and restrictions on subsequent employment by the regulated industry.
In its pure form, the body makes impartial choices even given a purely
partisan or self-interested appointment process; the agency is impartial
because its members have no interest in biased results. Of course, the
flip side is the risk that the regulators will have an idiosyncratic, minority
view of good policy that they impose on the polity with little hope of cor-
rection. The government loses influence.
The partisan-balancing model might also include institutional
constraints – as in most US independent regulatory agencies. However,
it has some distinct characteristics. Its basic form is a multi-member
agency that decides policy issues by majority or supermajority vote. To
contrast the two models, imagine a multi-member agency that is not insu-
lated from short-term partisan influence. Partisan appointees represent
their political supporters, and political actors can easily remove them.
In a two-party state, for example, a five-member commission might be
limited to three members from one party. The commission, operating
by majority rule, could sideline those affiliated with the minority party,
but that could undermine the perceived legitimacy of its rules and
policies.
The impartial-generalist model relies on commissions of inquiry com-
posed of people with reputations for probity and no personal stake in the
issue. Thus, impartiality results from the political appointment of people
who claim to be able to consider matters objectively. The danger is that
they are also ignorant; policy recommendations may be neutral but ill
informed. To counter this problem, regulated entities and other stake-
holders may have a leading role in presenting material to the commis-
sion. On the model of a common law judge, experts and groups who
30 For example, in Hungary justices of the Constitutional Court, Ombudsmen, and the
president of the Audit Office all must obtain the support of two-thirds of the
Parliament. Rose-Ackerman, From Elections to Democracy, supra note 5 at 57–60.
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have a narrow private interest in the outcome advise the commission but
have no decision-making authority. A member of the cabinet may then
vet the commission’s recommendations before issuing them as binding
rules or submitting them to the legislature for approval.
These models all raise difficult issues for judicial review of agency
actions. Should courts view the agencies like lower courts that have
resolved factual matters, so that review is only on legal issues? If so,
should the degree of deference to agency choices depend upon the
agency model in force? For example, if the agency operates under
court-like constraints, should the judicial review be more deferential
than if the agency’s operation is more closely tied to politics?
D PRIVATIZATION
The privatization model delegates rule-making authority to a private or
quasi-governmental body. The statute may specify the institution’s form
and membership and may require consultation with outsiders; alterna-
tively, it may simply delegate authority to the group and permit it to set
its own internal rules and to make substantive policy with few constraints.
In a pure case, consultation and oversight are limited to the group in
question, and the courts have no public-law oversight role. They may,
however, enforce the group’s standards as law.
Many countries have a long history of using private or quasi-
governmental organizations to set standards. In Germany, for example,
the German Institute for Norms (DIN) operates under a government
charter, and it has regulatory powers under a number of statutes.31 In
most countries the professions regulate themselves through associations
with exclusive mandates under rules that generally have legal force. For
example, Polish law has created nineteen self-governing groups, mostly
in the legal and health professions. Some of these groups must be con-
sulted by the government before it issues regulations that affect the
group’s members.32 Here the mixture of public and private roles some-
times produces hybrids that fail both as publicly accountable bodies
and as effective private associations.
Privatizing policy making raises delicate questions about the reach of
the state. In some cases, a law gives official status to an existing body
with a history of self-regulation. In others, a statute creates a new body,
sometimes applying the template of an established group to a new regu-
latory area. A profession may point to a long history of self-regulation and
the possession of esoteric knowledge, as with medical doctors or
31 Rose-Ackerman, Controlling Environmental Policy, supra note 5 at 63–5.
32 Rose-Ackerman, From Elections to Democracy, supra note 5 at 164, citing Maciej Kisilowski,
‘The Fig Leaf: How the Concept of Representativeness Deprives Polish Decision-
Making of Accountability’ (Yale Law School, 2004) [unpublished].
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engineers. Even so, the professional association may impose rules that put
overly strict limits on entry and overly lax constraints on service quality.
Professional norms may conflict with public-interest goals.
Under the corporatist or consensual variant, potentially conflicting
interests negotiate to make binding regulations, with or without govern-
ment input. These decisions may have an impact beyond those at the bar-
gaining table. In the labour-management area, the Scandinavian
countries provide the archetypal example where corporatist structures
are strong and labour-union membership is high. Few workers and
businesses lack representation, although even there the practice may
fall short.33 In other countries the national labour union/business
bodies have doubtful legitimacy. For example, in Hungary and Poland
labour-union membership is in decline, and the composition of the
national committees is an artefact of the transition process that has not
kept pace with evolving economic realities.34
V Implications and conclusions
Accountable administrative processes are costly and time consuming.
Major rule makings in the United States can take years to complete, fol-
lowed by court review.35 These practical difficulties, however, do not
undermine the basic principle that administrative law needs to be con-
cerned with effective democratic control of the administration. All
democracies face common problems of legislative drafting, delegation,
and oversight. However, a strong form of convergence is unlikely, both
because states carry out different substantive policies at different scales
and because of differences in their democratic constitutional structures.
Identical problems can produce divergent responses, no one of which
is obviously superior. This means that emerging democracies cannot
simply adopt ‘best practices’; they need to evaluate the options and
select the institutions and legal constraints best suited to their own
conditions.
Policy-making accountability is central to the democratic legitimacy of
emerging modern states, and administrative law is one route to such
accountability. To achieve that goal, the contrasting models mix public
accountability and expertise in different ways. All of them are
33 Michael J. Gorges, Euro-Corporatism? Interest Intermediation in the European Community
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1996); Leif Lewin, ‘The Rise and
Decline of Corporatism: The Case of Sweden’ (1994) 26 Eur.J.Pol.Res. 59.
34 Rose-Ackerman, From Elections to Democracy, supra note 5 at 131–7 [Rose-Ackerman].
35 Cary Coglianese, ‘Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated
Rulemaking,’ 46 Duke Law Journal 1255 at 1283–4, 1316. See also Rose-Ackerman,
supra note 34.
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encountered in various forms and combinations in established democra-
cies. Even so, there are important gaps and inconsistencies in existing law
and practice. The pursuit of policy-making accountability in both estab-
lished and emerging democracies faces predictable challenges that
depend on constitutional and administrative design.
As an empirical matter, one ought to expect cross-country differences
that result from differences in constitutional structures and the incentives
they create for politicians. Those interested in strengthening democracy
should not be content with the patterns of delegation, consultation, and
oversight that arise from the self-interested behaviour of politicians in
either parliamentary or presidential systems. The executive has wide-
ranging policy discretion in all democracies, and in some, private
bodies exercise public functions. Modern states need to expand partici-
pation rights beyond a predetermined group of stakeholders and to
make these rights – including rights to know about regulatory initiatives,
rights to present data and opinions, and rights to a public, reasoned
decision both from public agencies and from quasi-private bodies with
regulatory functions – legally enforceable in court. These rights will
not arise spontaneously; they need strong advocates in civil society.
Reforms in the emerging economies that have been the focus of much
of Michael Trebilcock’s work need to self-consciously consider how to
achieve democratic legitimacy not just in electoral systems but also in
the administration.
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